Drugs Out: Brain Stimulators In: Psychiatry’s Next Assault On Our Humanity?

On September 21, the Guardian/Observer (UK) ran an online article by Vaughan Bell titled Changing brains: why neuroscience is ending the Prozac eraThanks to Paul Mace on Twitter for the link.

The gist of the article is that although the use of psycho-pharmaceutical products is at an all-time high and is still rising in most parts of the world, the psychiatric promise of drug-induced happiness may be at, or close to, its peak.

 “In its place is a science focused on understanding the brain as a series of networks, each of which supports a different aspect of our experience and behaviour.”

For decades, psychiatry has been telling us, without evidence, that virtually all human problems are caused by “imbalances” in the chemicals that transmit messages between brain cells, and that these imbalances can be corrected by the drugs that pharma pays psychiatrists handsomely to promote.

The theory has always been nonsense, and has always had its critics, but we were voices in the wilderness, and were easily marginalized as “deniers” and “cranks.”

Today, thanks largely to the survivor movements and journalists like Robert Whitaker, the chemical imbalance theory is crashing about the feet of psychiatrists.  You might imagine that their response would be: gosh, we’re so sorry.  But no.  Their response is:  we never said that.

And – bold as ever – they’ve come up with a new theory to explain human woe:  faulty brain circuits!  But, take heart, sufferers, for relief is already here:  brain stimulating implants.  These are little gizmos that psychiatrists, presumably with the help of neurosurgeons, will implant inside your brain, neutralizing the precise circuit that’s causing you to worry about your children, or grieve for your deceased parent, or drink too much beer, or be violent, or throw the TV out the window – or whatever.

The article mentions a company called Medtronic, who claim that their products have been installed in the brains of more than 100,000 people.  Most of these were for the treatment of Parkinson’s disease but:

“…increasingly they are being trialled for a wider range of problems. Recent studies have examined direct brain stimulation for treating pain, epilepsy, eating disorders, addiction, controlling aggression, enhancing memory and for intervening in a range of other behavioural problems.”

 And Medtronic is just one manufacturer of these devices.  Other manufacturers include Boston Scientific and St. Jude Medical Inc.

But history has a way of repeating itself.  Here are some quotes from an AP report on Yahoo Finance dated December 12, 2011:

“Medtronic Inc., the world’s largest maker of medical devices, has agreed to pay $23.5 million to settle allegations that it paid kickbacks to doctors to implant its pacemakers and defibrillators, the U.S. Justice Department said Monday.”

 “Over the past three years, the Justice Department has reached settlements with two other major medical devices makers — Boston Scientific and St. Jude Medical Inc. — over similar kickback allegations.”

Doesn’t that have a familiar ring?

Psychiatry – ever anxious to acquire physiological treatment to validate its spurious concepts and destructive track record – is embracing deep-brain stimulation with its characteristic fervor.  I’ve just Googled “deep brain stimulation psychiatry mental illness,” and got 1.7 million hits!  So the idea is catching on.

Columbia University’s psychiatry department (Chairman Jeffrey Lieberman, MD) has an information sheet on its Brain Stimulation Service.  Here’s a quote:

“Stimulation with electrical or magnetic energy interacts with neurons, causing them to release chemicals called neurotransmitters, and possibly also helping form more healthy synapses, or connections, between nerve cells. Repeated stimulation can modulate or ‘reset’ the activity of specific regions of the brain to exert significant changes.”

Emory University has an article, Deep brain stimulation for psychiatric disorders, on PubMed.  Here’s a quote:

“Investigators have produced preliminary data on the safety and efficacy of DBS for several psychiatric disorders, as well.”

So pretty soon, when people who are sad and depressed meet with their families and friends, they can talk about the gizmos inside their brains instead of talking about – and this is radical – the things that are making them sad and depressed.

Does anybody remember Harrison Bergeron?

 

  • Nick Stuart

    Kurt Vonnegut Jr! Genius. Doesn’t this stuff actually make people frightened. I am scared to death! Good piece Phil.

  • Nanu Grewal

    The circles that we conspire to revolve around humanity through the generations: this is just lobotomy for the digital age

  • Francesca Allan

    I wonder what the implications of this will be for forced treatment. Actually, I don’t wonder; I fear.

  • Phil_Hickey

    Nanu,

    I hadn’t thought of it that way – but I think you’re right!

  • Phil_Hickey

    Francesca,

    If a person can be legally compelled to submit to drugs and shock “treatment,” presumably he/she can be compelled to accept implanted brain stimulators. Definitely cause for concern.

  • Mick Bramham

    There’s a lot of media hype around treatments like DBS and far too little is being said about the risks and the potential for conflicts of interest. Some readers may be interested in this http://blog.mythsandrisks.info/2013/07/deep-brain-stimulation-treating-or.html

  • elsiep

    On twitter, I accused Phil of lumping together a lot of issues in this piece, and he invited me to comment here.

    Although I would broadly agree with Phil’s view that much psychiatric practice is based on unfounded assumptions, is often unhelpful or makes things worse for the people it purports to help, and that the pharmaceutical industry is making a vast profit out of not improving people’s lot, treating a bunch of highly complex issues as if they are all part and parcel of one another, doesn’t appear to me to be a productive way forward.

    For example, Phil says:

    “For decades, psychiatry has been telling us, without evidence, that virtually all human problems are caused by “imbalances” in the chemicals that transmit messages between brain cells and that these imbalances can be corrected by the drugs that pharma pays psychiatrists handsomely to promote.”

    Well, sort of. But ‘psychiatry’ isn’t a homogeneous thing, it’s a domain of expertise populated by people with very diverse conceptual models of what, for want of a better term, I’ll call ‘mental health’. And actually, there is evidence that some human problems do have chemical causes; people have self-medicated, effectively, with alcohol and other chemicals for millennia. The only people I’ve come across who attribute ‘virtually all human problems’ to chemical ‘imbalances’ have been conspiracy theorists, and not very knowledgeable conspiracy theorists at that. Many overstretched and/or condescending clinicians might tell patients that mental health problems are caused by chemical ‘imbalances’; others are more upfront and say ‘we don’t know what’s causing these problems but this medication might be worth a try’. And doubtless some psychiatrists might have been influenced by handsome payments from pharma, but some GPs have told me they won’t see medical reps because they view them as a waste of time, if not space, and I have no reason to suppose psychiatrists are any different.

    This is what I mean about lumping together the complex issues involved. If we are to tackle the obviously questionable thinking and practice that Phil alludes to, those complex issues must be teased out and approached separately – because they are different to one another. The behaviour of pharmaceutical companies isn’t the same as a particular clinician’s conceptual model of depression, and isn’t going to be resolved in the same way.

    Phil then goes on to suggest that a theory of ‘faulty brain circuits’ will replace drugs as a way of dealing with mental health problems. This is indeed an alarming prospect, but it’s not alarming because of the ‘brain circuits’ theory, or even the gizmos that might zap them (no one seems to be making a fuss about heart pacemakers), but because of how people think about mental health problems.

    Many years ago, a student friend of mine, who was a member of an evangelical church, got a vacation job at a local brewery. Some other members of his church were shocked and lectured him on the evils of alcohol. They couldn’t see how he could justify working for a company that was indirectly responsible for violence and vandalism. He pointed out that the problem wasn’t the alcohol, it was people’s behaviour. People have caused havoc over the centuries with salt, fire and pointy sticks, but no one’s suggesting the cause was salt, fire or the pointy stick.

    A fundamental flaw in the way we, as a species, approach ‘mental health’ problems (indeed ‘virtually all problems’) is that we ‘satisfice’ – we have a tendency to stop searching once we’ve found an explanation, solution or theory that fits the data or meets our needs, regardless of how many better explanations, solutions or theories might be out there. If Phil could come up with a way of getting influential figures to avoid satisficing, we’d be over halfway to resolving the sorry state we’re in.

    Sue

  • Phil_Hickey

    elsiep,

    Welcome back. Thanks for coming in.

    You write: “…psychiatry isn’t a homogeneous thing…”

    Literally, of course, you are correct. There are dissenting psychiatrists, but I suggest they are very few in number, and relatively subdued in the expressions of their dissent. The great majority of psychiatrists subscribe to the APA’s orthodoxy, as set out in the DSM. The essential tenet of the DSM is that any significant problem of thinking, feeling and/or behaving is a mental illness/disorder. The DSM also embodies the notion that the “mental disorders” are the causes of the problems. Over the past 30 years or so, the assumption has gained ground in psychiatry that these “mental disorders/illnesses” are chemical imbalances in the brain. In very recent years, this theory has been critiqued heavily by “the opposition,” and many psychiatrists are in retreat (retreating to faulty brain circuits), but prior to this, I was never aware of any significant dissent within psychiatry to this notion. Nor am I aware of any articles/books written by psychiatrists critiquing the chemical imbalance theory published prior to, say, five years ago. I’m not saying that such expressions of dissent don’t exist, just that I’m not aware of them.

    Incidentally, I’ve discussed these general issues in some detail in a critique that I wrote on one of Dr. Steven Novella’s articles. Rather than repeat all of this here, perhaps you could take a look at the critique.

    Another area where there has been almost universal agreement among psychiatrists, again until very recently, is the notion that the condition known as schizophrenia is an inevitably progressive brain disease and that it is best “treated” by ingesting neuroleptic drugs without interruption for life. Both of which notions are currently receiving intense criticism (from outside psychiatry), and both of which have proven to be false.

    From your perspective, psychiatry may look like a group of people with “very diverse conceptual models,” but for my part, I haven’t seen this in recent decades. Off the top of my head, the last seriously dissenting psychiatrist I can remember (aside from Thomas Szasz) is Eric Berne, and I would be very surprised if there were 50 psychiatrists in America today who use his ideas in their day-to-day practice.

    But I’m open to persuasion. If you are aware of significant pockets of dissent, or even individuals who have been challenging the orthodoxy in significant ways, let me know.

    You say: “And actually, there is evidence that some human problems do have chemical causes…”

    This is true, and I have stated this clearly in many places in the website.

    You say: “Many overstretched and/or condescending clinicians might tell patients that mental health problems are caused by chemical ‘imbalances’…”

    You seem to be saying that they don’t really believe this. I’m not sure what to make of this. Are you saying that lying to clients about such a fundamental matter is preferable to being in error?

    I have no doubt that some psychiatrists choose not to see drug reps. I’ve no idea what proportion of psychiatrists fall into this category. But I don’t see what this has to do with their level of commitment to APA orthodoxy. A psychiatrist might be a dyed-in-the-wool bio-psychiatric adherent, but might choose not to see drug reps, for any number of reasons.

    You say: “This [the promotion of the brain circuit theories] is indeed an alarming prospect, but it’s not alarming because of the ‘brain circuits’ theory…but because of how people think about mental health problems.”

    I think you’re contradicting yourself here, or at least we’re at cross-purposes. The central issue is indeed how to conceptualize significant problems of thinking, feeling and/or behaving. I conceptualize these as –problems of thinking, feeling, and/or behaving, and, when I was in practice, I helped clients explore the sources of these problems in a highly individualized way. Orthodox psychiatry conceptualizes these problems as mental illnesses/disorders, and actively promotes the notion that these putative entities are actually brain illnesses – first chemical imbalances; now faulty brain circuits.

    “…salt, fire, and pointy sticks…”

    Here again, I’m not sure what you’re getting at. In my view, psychiatry is based on spurious concepts. And these spurious concepts drive and underpin psychiatry’s destructive, stigmatizing, and disempowering practices. Obviously a concept can only cause harm when internalized and acted upon by a person. I have some ideas as to why psychiatry has embraced its current orthodoxy, but the fact is that it has, and it is destructive.

    And yet for all this, I find myself in complete agreement with your last paragraph. One of my primary criticisms of psychiatric “diagnoses” is that they create the impression that the problem has been identified, and explained. In this way, they act as an effective barrier to empathic listening and genuinely collaborative exploration – which in my view is essential in a helping profession.

    As to “…getting influential figures to avoid satisficing…” – well, I don’t think I can do that. But you are correct to point out that the time has come for those of us on this side of the debate to move beyond critiquing the orthodoxy and become more active in promoting the kinds of ideas that we would like to see implemented.

    Again, thanks for coming and, and best wishes.

  • elsiep

    Phil: “You write: “…psychiatry isn’t a homogeneous thing…”
    Literally, of course, you are correct. There are dissenting psychiatrists, but I suggest they are very few in number, and relatively subdued in the expressions of their dissent. The great majority of psychiatrists subscribe to the APA’s orthodoxy, as set out in the DSM. ”

    Me: Over the past decade, I’ve read, listened to and watched many psychiatrists. Most, voicing their thoughts on autism and other developmental ‘disorders’ rather than ‘mental illness’ but nonetheless I’ve seen a wide range of worldviews, from quasi-Freudians, through those who seem to attribute all developmental anomalies to disorders of attachment, to those who would like to see a complete genetic profile and physiological work-up of their patients if affordable.

    It could be that this diversity of opinion exists only amongst psychiatrists dealing with developmental issues, and that those dealing with ‘mental illness’ are almost exclusively of one mind, but I find that difficult to believe. A field might be dominated by a particular conceptual model, but it doesn’t follow that all professionals within that field ascribe to it.

    Phil: “The essential tenet of the DSM is that any significant problem of thinking, feeling and/or behaving is a mental illness/disorder. The DSM also embodies the notion that the “mental disorders” are the causes of the problems. Over the past 30 years or so, the assumption has gained ground in psychiatry that these “mental disorders/illnesses” are chemical imbalances in the brain. ”

    Me: I’m well aware of the problems with the DSM. But the DSM isn’t ‘psychiatry’. Nor is psychiatry the only profession involved with ‘mental illness’.

    Phil: “In very recent years, this theory has been critiqued heavily by “the opposition,” and many psychiatrists are in retreat (retreating to faulty brain circuits), but prior to this, I was never aware of any significant dissent within psychiatry to this notion. Nor am I aware of any articles/books written by psychiatrists critiquing the chemical imbalance theory published prior to, say, five years ago. I’m not saying that such expressions of dissent don’t exist, just that I’m not aware of them.

    Incidentally, I’ve discussed these general issues in some detail in a critique that I wrote on one of Dr. Steven Novella’s articles. Rather than repeat all of this here, perhaps you could take a look at the critique.”

    Me: Phil, you appear to be intent on polarising this issue. Take for example, Novella’s use of the term ‘symptoms’. Economists and historians use the term ‘symptoms’ to denote emergent indicators of all sorts of things, not usually illnesses. Even in a medical context, to the best of my knowledge, ‘symptoms’ (as distinct from ‘sign’) refers to what someone experiences that indicates that something is wrong, not necessarily that they have an illness or disease.

    Phil: “From your perspective, psychiatry may look like a group of people with “very diverse conceptual models,” but for my part, I haven’t seen this in recent decades. Off the top of my head, the last seriously dissenting psychiatrist I can remember (aside from Thomas Szasz) is Eric Berne, and I would be very surprised if there were 50 psychiatrists in America today who use his ideas in their day-to-day practice.”

    Me: Laing?
    America isn’t the only place where psychiatrists exist. Just saying.

    Phil: “You say: “And actually, there is evidence that some human problems do have chemical causes…”
    This is true, and I have stated this clearly in many places in the website.”

    Me: But you don’t mention that in the post I was responding to. Instead, you say ‘this theory has always been nonsense’, but you are not clear which bit of the theory you are referring to. That’s my point. If you lump issues together, the unwary reader might get the wrong impression.

    Phil: “You say: “Many overstretched and/or condescending clinicians might tell patients that mental health problems are caused by chemical ‘imbalances’…”

    You seem to be saying that they don’t really believe this. I’m not sure what to make of this. Are you saying that lying to clients about such a fundamental matter is preferable to being in error?”

    Me: You’re putting words into my mouth. It isn’t always possible for clinicians to explain, in detail, the complexities of what they suspect to be causing a patient’s condition. I’ve heard doctors say some stupid things, but none has ever said ‘You have x. This medication will make you better.’ They have always been more circumspect; ‘The problem might be x.’ This medication might help. Come back if you don’t feel better in a couple of weeks.’ More likely to say ‘We think this problem is due to a chemical imbalance in the brain. We’ll try these pills and see if they help’ which isn’t quite the same as *lying*.

    Phil: “I have no doubt that some psychiatrists choose not to see drug reps. I’ve no idea what proportion of psychiatrists fall into this category. But I don’t see what this has to do with their level of commitment to APA orthodoxy. A psychiatrist might be a dyed-in-the-wool bio-psychiatric adherent, but might choose not to see drug reps, for any number of reasons.”

    Me: In your post you referred to ‘the drugs that pharma pays psychiatrists handsomely to promote’. Again, the unwary reader might conclude that you were referring to all psychiatrists, or that payment from ‘pharma’ was the reason a psychiatrist might be a ‘dyed-in-the-wool bio-psychiatric adherent’. These are different issues. You have lumped them together.

    Phil: “You say: “This [the promotion of the brain circuit theories] is indeed an alarming prospect, but it’s not alarming because of the ‘brain circuits’ theory…but because of how people think about mental health problems.”
    I think you’re contradicting yourself here, or at least we’re at cross-purposes. ”

    Me: I think we were at cross-purposes. I inferred (wrongly, it seems) that you were concerned about the technology as much as the uses to which it could be put.

    Phil: “As to “…getting influential figures to avoid satisficing…” – well, I don’t think I can do that. ”

    Me: I wasn’t suggesting you could. But it’s a key issue and one people are often unaware of.

    Phil: “But you are correct to point out that the time has come for those of us on this side of the debate to move beyond critiquing the orthodoxy and become more active in promoting the kinds of ideas that we would like to see implemented.”

    Me: I reiterate my original point. You are referring to a complex bunch of issues. The debate has many sides. I think you’re polarising again.

  • Phil_Hickey

    elsiep,

    You say that some problems of thinking, feeling, and/or behaving are caused by organic factors.

    I agree.

    You say, or at least I think you say, that much of what psychiatry does is destructive and disempowering.

    I agree.

    But you also seem to be saying that we shouldn’t critique psychiatric “diagnoses” as spurious until we have absolutely exhausted every possibility that a problem of thinking, feeling, and/or behaving might have an underlying, organic cause.

    In my view, this is setting the bar too high.  In science, it is almost impossible to prove a negative with 100% certainty.  For example, the proposition:  there is a mouse in this building, is proved by finding one mouse.  But proving that there are no mice in the building is virtually impossible because every unsuccessful search for a mouse can be challenged on the grounds that the mouse was too well hidden to be found.

    In addition, in science the burden of proof lies with the party making the extreme, or least parsimonious, claim.

    If a depressed person tells me that he’s depressed because he’s lost his job, and his son’s in jail, and his daughter is using crack cocaine, it seems to me that this is very likely to be a genuine explanation of his depression.

    But psychiatry says:  No!  He’s depressed because he has a mental illness, which they also claim, when it suits their purposes, is a brain illness.  This is an extreme claim for which they don’t offer proof.

    But the lack of proof isn’t the only issue.  The conceptual framework is spurious.  Essentially what psychiatrists say is this:  All significant problems of thinking, feeling, and/or behaving are mental illnesses.  Depression is a problem of thinking, feeling, or behaving.  Therefore depression is a mental illness.  “Mental illness” is just something that psychiatrists have decided to call significant problems of thinking, feeling, and/or behaving.

    If psychiatrists were honest with their clients, they would say something like this.  We have no idea why you’re having this particular problem of thinking, feeling, and /or behaving.  We have a name for it, though, and the name is such and such.  Our reliability in this regard, however, is quite poor, and if you go to another psychiatrist, he might call it something else entirely.  This doesn’t matter as much as you might think, because all we do really is prescribe psychoactive drugs.  These products alter thinking, feeling, and behaving in ways that are somewhat, though by no means completely, predictable.  There’s a very good chance that you will experience adverse effects.  Some of these are extremely serious and some are irreversible.  In particular, it needs to be emphasized that these drugs do not correct any deficit, malfunction, or anomaly in your brain.  Etc., etc…

    I’ve never known, or even heard of, a psychiatrist who said anything even remotely like this.

    Best wishes.

  • elsiep

    Phil: “You say that some problems of thinking, feeling, and/or behaving are caused by organic factors.
    I agree.
    You say, or at least I think you say, that much of what psychiatry does is destructive and disempowering.
    I agree.”

    Me: Yes, I am saying both those things.

    Phil: “But you also seem to be saying that we shouldn’t critique psychiatric “diagnoses” as spurious until we have absolutely exhausted every possibility that a problem of thinking, feeling, and/or behaving might have an underlying, organic cause.”

    Me: No. I’m not equating problems of thinking, feeling and/or behaving with the psychiatric diagnostic system. Identifying similarities in problems of thinking, feeling and/or behaving across individuals might be a useful thing to do, since the assumption that the same clusters of problem characteristics might have similar causes isn’t an unreasonable one. However, the taxonomy of problems of thinking, feeling and/or behaving set out in the DSM is pretty ropey as a taxonomy, even before you start considering what might be causing the problems of thinking, feeling and/or behaving.

    So I’m not saying that we shouldn’t critique psychiatric ‘diagnoses’. Far from it. What I am saying is that problems of thinking, feeling and/or behaving can have organic origins other than ‘mental illness’. Organic origins that might not be picked up in routine medical screenings. That needs to be borne in mind.

    Phil: “In my view, this is setting the bar too high. In science, it is almost impossible to prove a negative with 100% certainty. For example, the proposition: there is a mouse in this building, is proved by finding one mouse. But proving that there are no mice in the building is virtually impossible because every unsuccessful search for a mouse can be challenged on the grounds that the mouse was too well hidden to be found.”

    Me: Indeed, but I wasn’t suggesting we have to exhaust every possibility of an organic cause. Just that often the ‘general medical condition’ net isn’t spread wide enough, and even if no ‘general medical condition’ is found, you can’t assume there isn’t one.

    Phil: “In addition, in science the burden of proof lies with the party making the extreme, or least parsimonious, claim.
    If a depressed person tells me that he’s depressed because he’s lost his job, and his son’s in jail, and his daughter is using crack cocaine, it seems to me that this is very likely to be a genuine explanation of his depression.
    But psychiatry says: No! He’s depressed because he has a mental illness, which they also claim, when it suits their purposes, is a brain illness. This is an extreme claim for which they don’t offer proof.”

    Me: Except that parsimony doesn’t involve finding the most obvious explanation, it involves finding the hypothesis offering an explanation for a phenomenon but making the fewest assumptions. Many people who think they’ve been abducted by aliens conclude that alien abduction offers the most obvious explanation for their experiences. Unfortunately, alien abduction involves a large number of assumptions. Sleep paralysis is a far more parsimonious hypothesis even if we can’t ‘prove’ that that’s what the person experienced. Even then it doesn’t follow that every individual reporting alien abduction has experienced sleep paralysis. Nor that they have been abducted by aliens.

    You’re quite right, many people would feel depressed in the situation you describe. But it’s not a simple case of people either feeling depressed because of a ‘general medical condition’ or ‘mental illness’ or life events. Sometimes all of those things are involved. Most of the time we wouldn’t know what was involved, and would have to do some careful hypothesis testing.

    Psychiatry, in theory at least, makes a distinction between understandable responses to life events and ‘mental illness’. People reporting onset of depression in conjunction with adverse life events shouldn’t be diagnosed with clinical depression, unless there’s evidence that their depression isn’t entirely dependent on the life events. Whether psychiatry does that in practice is another matter.

    Phil: “But the lack of proof isn’t the only issue. The conceptual framework is spurious. Essentially what psychiatrists say is this: All significant problems of thinking, feeling, and/or behaving are mental illnesses. Depression is a problem of thinking, feeling, or behaving. Therefore depression is a mental illness. “Mental illness” is just something that psychiatrists have decided to call significant problems of thinking, feeling, and/or behaving.
    If psychiatrists were honest with their clients, they would say something like this. We have no idea why you’re having this particular problem of thinking, feeling, and /or behaving. We have a name for it, though, and the name is such and such. Our reliability in this regard, however, is quite poor, and if you go to another psychiatrist, he might call it something else entirely. This doesn’t matter as much as you might think, because all we do really is prescribe psychoactive drugs. These products alter thinking, feeling, and behaving in ways that are somewhat, though by no means completely, predictable. There’s a very good chance that you will experience adverse effects. Some of these are extremely serious and some are irreversible. In particular, it needs to be emphasized that these drugs do not correct any deficit, malfunction, or anomaly in your brain. Etc., etc…
    I’ve never known, or even heard of, a psychiatrist who said anything even remotely like this.”

    Me: But your experience isn’t necessarily a reliable gauge. In Europe, many psychiatrists still use ‘talking therapies’, so claiming that ‘all we do really is prescribe psychoactive drugs’ would be untrue. Also, some drugs do correct ‘deficits, malfunctions or anomalies’ in the brain, although I can understand why there might be objections to describing variations in brain function in that way, and to psychiatrists guessing that that’s the cause of the problem.

    Although sympathetic to many points you’ve made, my main difficulty with your view is that it comes across (to me at least) as simplistic and polarised, when psychiatry as a profession, the drug industry as an industry and the causes of people’s problems of thinking, feeling and behaving, are all complex. Obviously, you can’t refer to all of the complexities all of the time, but some of your statements do reinforce my impression that the issues are being oversimplified.

  • Mark Eccles

    Ren & Stimpy Happy Helment Joy Joy song . An external (happy) brain stimulator is removed by a hammer.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y0V4TZAyd8I